**Proposing Structures for Propositional Facts**

‘Can we take the sentential relation to be the relation which unifies the constituents of a proposition? I don't think we can. It seems to me to be clear that they are different sorts of relations.’ Matthew Davidson 2018, ‘Propositions as Structural Entities’ Davidson is one of many authors like Bealer, Hanks, King, Moore, Parsons, Stalnaker, Sawyer and Soames etc. to consider the case for the structure of propositional facts. Despite this, no propositional facts can escape from Bradley’s regress: the value of their internal relations do not substantiate the appearance, for the adjectives of their reality A&R 1893 chap 2&3   
  
Take the two sentences ‘Socrates was a philosopher’ and ‘Socrates was a character in a play’. Both appear to have structure; even if there is no certainty regarding both being a fact. Neither determines whether it or the other is true or false. As facts, they don’t provide the reasons for the contradictions of predication; for their existential or universal conditions. Likewise, neither does R&W’s axiom of reducibility to site their example, for all the predicates that make Napoleon a great general. Propositional facts and the facts of those facts do not determine their own conditions.   
The Problem for logicians, how are propositions as brute facts structured by being facts if they could’ve been otherwise?  
 Consider the identity of an abstract proposition ‘p’. The more abstract the representation p, say ‘being is a fact’, so propositional facts are the only truth. Being distributive, propositional facts create a paradox as their generalisation is neither true nor false. It is a fact, but a fact that has no spatial or temporal measure. What you get with a reduction to propositional facts, is a less coherent conception of the concept; the essential properties of their class. These must be determined, so they can have a determinate value for the agent, else what is believed to be the case, is the case. ‘Socrates was a philosopher’ is no more of a fact than ‘Socrates was a good philosopher’. Neither as facts substantiates the value of their prediction. The adjective ‘good’, is neither refers to it always true or sometimes being true or not. Bradley’s example of a sugar cube, being white, square and sweet is just another example belonging to an endless list of adjectives that would have no quality. This is only the case for propositional facts if they constitute their own structures. No scientific reasons are given for how they do this as independent entities. As depend on the opinion of the agent, neither is there relation to other agents demonstrated. With a list of adjectives, the indeterminate value of the explanation means the sensation of their quanta is only a description.

Take fractal geometry, say it is constituted by the Hamiltonian operator; the eigenvectors and eigenvalues of Schrödinger’s mysterious wave function, the fact is just a tuning. All you get is the fact of all facts and so substantiating the regression to propositional facts is an abductio ad absurdum. The addition of properties described by adjectives, fuzzy or sharp merely adds to the appearance of the proposition for its predicates, not the value of it. Its relation to the quality of the experience it is describing is not an explanation of their being. Consider: what classes constitute the identity of a proposition? Certainly not a class; a reductionist logistic to facts, as events are limited to what has changed within the lexicography. For what will change (‘Frank drinks wine’ Davidson), or can change and even what cannot or won’t change cannot be verified for processes. Facts don’t process facts.

As presented, propositions are not just entities in isolation but depend on the context of their composition. Facts are composed, as they are not magically conceived. How are they composed is conceptually determined by their relation to what the proposition refers to? It is not just a sensation, unless the language is alien or an unknown relic. If processes are just facts, propositional facts cannot be structured. With facts being the conditions for more facts there is no reason for the relation of their structure. The unstructured; brute facts severed from the real processes of events have no truth conditions for ‘Socrates is snub-nosed.’ The predicate of the subject has no means to weigh what is rational for statistical inference. Worse, any inductive analysis has no deductive validity as there are no limits given by the propositional facts to verify the propositions constituents. While both ‘Socrates as a character in a play’ and ‘Socrates was a philosopher’ are relevant to Plato’s artistic license, they are not the constituents of it. This makes the structure of logistic (quantitative records of propositional facts) reductions to propositional facts as having indeterminate conditions. Aren’t they supposed to be conceived by propositional functions; the classes, modules of I/O streams for data analytic programs can be compiled to run on coded structures? The properties of the propositional facts are not necessarily real conditions; given their values are the conditions of their being. Being recombined: ‘Plato’s Socrates was partly a character in his play and partly an account of his philosophy. Their relation cannot be the consequence of a rational decision, if it is claimed that facts are the conditions that determine their propositional value and not merely the appearance of it. With brute facts, no reason can be given for the conditions of their values. Facts are not the conditions for their being. Events have a better claim to that than facts. Clearly the utterance or the presence of a proposition, are not the conditions for the reason of its being. Being real, the fact doesn’t even refer to itself as an actual proposition. Any proposition that is posited can be described as a fact, but what it refers to needn’t be one. In either case the sensation of its appearance does not process what is necessary or possible for its being.   
 Propositions as brute facts have no valid principle, only a reductionist logistic. Describing what is real, means the description of it is merely a convention; an abduction of the analytic. Explanation is more than a list or collection of atoms. Even though the understanding might believe it otherwise, the brute fact of their constituents’ relation does not raise their reductionist logistic above the indeterminate! This is its absolute value. Only what is determinate for the relation of the conditions belonging to what is conditional for propositions means they can be made and processed.

Facts are contingent, so cannot preserve their own values. This means propositions can be otherwise I.e. ‘Socrates had a hump nose’. It is an otherwise of appearance that makes propositions a fact. The sub-contrary means it can be otherwise and this presents the case for what is possible. Or if they contradict what can be otherwise, the impossible is posited. It cannot be otherwise - so its contrary is; it is not otherwise - which is what is necessary. Reducing the value of propositions to what is an otherwise; the identity of propositional has intermediate values as opposed to determinate limits! If facts determine the limits for the relation of chance functions for decision making, the scope of their concept is not just about the appearance of what has changes. Presupposing that which is not otherwise are propositional facts just confounds them with their being an otherwise. Contradiction is therefore consequence of that reasoning which takes the necessary to be a cause from which their contingency is an effect. Indeterminacy is the consequence of presupposing their higher standpoint within reductionist logistic. With a structured analysis of propositions, their semantic content is more or less intelligible. ‘All facts are an otherwise for events’ can therefore only be proven as distributive within the dialectic. Ayer was wrong about their necessity: S is necessary if and only if it is analytic (Davidson), but truth by the definition of what the concept means holds for all modal terms. This also entails any proof must have a synthetic component:

1. Propositional facts if and only if they are Not otherwise [Assumption]
2. Propositional facts are an otherwise if and only if they are Not otherwise [Introduction of contingency]
3. Facts are an otherwise if and only if they are Not otherwise [Elimination of propositions]
4. Propositions are necessary if and only if they are Not otherwise [Analytical proposition]
5. 4) contradicts 1)

QED No logistic; inclusion of all the predicates corresponding to the reduction of propositional facts can undermine the significance of Bradley’s regress for propositional structures.

Propositions are structured by what is necessary for what is possible and contingent. They are not structured by facts alone. That which is true for the possible calculation of chances and their order which is contingent entails the limits of their relations. If not, there would be no differences for the way chances are calculated, just as with models predicting the movement of the planets. No knowledge of chances for the possible states of the events properties would then undermine their limits. Inadmissible futures would be allowed. Davidson’s appeal following Everette and Lewis, to being true for all possible worlds, is not the same as being real for the chance of all possible actualities. Being true for all possible worlds is what is true for the chances of the actualities’ possibilities. QED, a plurality of counterparts for many worlds like ours cannot be instantiated by a propositional fact.